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Internal Factors and Its Impact  
on IranIan ForeIgn polIcy
A state’s foreign policy is the process interconnected with several influential factors and 
complicated interplay between internal (domestic) and external policies. The external 
policy always reveals internal conditioning, but also in reverse (Rosneau, 1967).
In the democratic model the state’s foreign policy is thoroughly discussed and 
should have minimal societal acceptance. In case of collisions between societal expec-
tations and the chosen course of foreign policy, it could bring about severe criticism, 
empowering the opposition, but in the long run it may bring rising support for the 
government. The problem of the nature of a democratic system is the electoral calen-
dar. It is a relatively short time for a deep change of foreign policy and to convince 
the public opinion of its main assumptions. The main ambitious projects are difficult 
to achieve. However, the assumption of public support as a precondition of a steady 
governmental policy is often misleading. The most evident example is Neville Cham-
berlain’s appeasement strategy towards Hitler’s demands. It gained heavy societal sup-
port and was pursued according to public’s its expectations. Picture the moment when 
the triumphant Prime Minster Chamberlain was greeted as the only savior of peace just 
after Munich. In 1940 the opposition condemned this as a naïve and dangerous course 
which even accelerated the war. The appeasement policy is treated as a historical mis-
take and improper answer to the rising power of the Third Reich. Taking into account 
another example of public opinion, the vast majority of a shocked American society 
supported G. W. Bush’s controversial global War on Terrorism after 9/11 with an inva-
sion of Iraq, considered an evident harbor for Al-Qaeda and as a threat of possessing 
an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, most of these accusations 
were not based on facts and the public’s rising criticism finally urged Washington to 
withdraw American troops from Iraq, which is far from stable as of now (Mintz, DeR-
ouen, 2010: 41–45).
In a model democracy there are constrains and institutional frameworks affecting 
foreign policy. Likewise, there are several influential actors in the United States within 
the presidential administration alongside the president and state secretary, including 
security advisory staff, Congress, the judiciary system, groups of interest, the intel-
ligence community, think-tank networks, media and many minor actors as observers, 
activists, local leaders, et cetera. Theoretically, the public opinion is empowered with 
many tools through which it can evoke the debate on controversial issues related to 
internal and external policies and ultimately correct it. For the executive branch to pur-
sue goals which are difficult or unacceptable for the public, is difficult and risky in the 
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long term. However, there are examples of misguiding the public opinion on foreign 
and security policy goals. In a properly functioning democracy, the public opinion, 
through the media system and activists and NGO’s networks, would certainly demand 
more precise information and an explanation of the costs and difficulties of a chosen 
foreign policy course. Historical examples of misguiding of the American public opin-
ion are the Vietnam War, Iran-Contras affair, and the motives behind the Iraq War in 
2003. These collisions with the public opinion forced decision makers to correct its 
foreign policy course. Negatively affecting the public opinion’s perception is a fake 
news phenomenon and a visible factor leading to misperceptions on foreign policy 
issues. It is quite a new problem and potentially destructive for democratic systems 
and decision-making processes. The abovementioned tools in the American system are 
strong enough to face this challenge (Brancati, 2014: 313–326).
In a classical model of the autocratic system, it seems like there are not as many 
actors involved in foreign policy debate. However, this does not mean they are nonex-
istent. Investigating autocratic systems in its different forms, in between the autocratic 
and totalitarian state, it seems that only one evident and omnipotent decision-making 
center exists. Such a simplification is misleading and superficial, it depends on the 
autocratic system and its specific nature. The autocratic power is not only based on 
terror but also on a hammered-in consensus among different players. In case of some 
Arab, African and Central Asia states, the stability is achieved through clan, intersect 
or interethnic compromise. The instability of Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen or the civil 
war in Tajikistan (1992–1997) is an evident example of undermined and broken con-
sensus. After the downfall of an autocratic system it is difficult to rearrange a new 
consensus which assures stability. The problem is related to the internal perennial strife 
that is additionally fueled by the involvement of external actors. Gaining a minimum 
of legitimacy is a significant factor for the stability of an autocratic system. Like-
wise, in a democracy as well as in an autocratic model, foreign policy reveals internal 
conditioning and specific decision-making arrangements to some extent. The role of 
public opinion and other actors is limited but some differences on foreign policy can 
be located in institutional framework, especially with a semi-dual system like in Iran 
(Burnell, 2006: 545–562).
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is an example of more complicated decision-
making processes, including the specific link between ideology and national interests, 
or dogmatism versus pragmatism in analyzing Iranian foreign policy (Ramazani, 2004: 
549–559). The first example are the specific institutional arrangements of the IRI’s 
political structure. Noteworthy is that it is composed of theocratic institutions which 
seem to have republican characteristics (Rakel, 2007: 159–87). The IRI is based on 
the Islamic law and Shia politicized ideology. The main feature of the IRI is an imbal-
ance in favor of theocratic power, but with noticeable rivalry and factionist tendencies 
within the political system. Debates and different opinions are an effect of representing 
a wider spectrum and also a choice, naturally within the IRI’s framework, which may 
be perceived as an effective strategy for a stronger legitimacy factor. However, contro-
versies arose when the societal expectations of candidates from the reformer faction 
went too far, as in case of the Green Movement, which was suppressed through harsh 
repressions.
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The IRI’s political system is based on the ideological foundations derived from 
the concepts of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. His idea is based on the concept 
of velayat-e faqih. According to Khomeinism, the velayat-e faqih, commonly known 
as the Supreme Leader, is the legal leader of the ummah (Islamic community). His 
function is thus equal to that of the imam. After the Islamic Revolution, the velayat-e 
faqih is located centrally within the IRI’s political system and is the most significant 
guarantor of the status quo as of now, able to suppress changes which may poten-
tially undermine the basic tenets of the Islamic Revolution. The Supreme Leader is 
an ultimate decision maker. Article 110 specifies some of the powers of the Supreme 
Leader, including: (1) delineation of grand policies for the regime; (2) supervision 
of the execution of the grand policies; (3) commander in chief of all armed forces, 
such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), paramilitary Basij, regular 
armed forces, and the police; (4) declaration of war and peace; (5) appointment and 
dismissal of the head of the judicial branch, the six clerical members of the Council of 
Guardians, the head of the state radio and television monopoly, the head of the IRGC, 
the head of the regular military, the chairman of the joint chiefs of all armed forces; 
and (6) dismissal of the president after a vote by the Majles (parliament) or a decision 
of the high court. The Supreme Leader has the religious supervisory bodies to his 
disposal (the Council of the Guardian [Majles-e Khobregan], the Expediency Coun-
cil [Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam], and the Assembly of Experts (Shora-
ye Maslahat-e Nezam). (Riefer-Flanagan, 2013: 55–61). This does not mean that the 
power of the Supreme Leader is unlimited. The Supreme Leader shares power with 
the republican institutions to some extent. There are three governmental branches: the 
executive, the judiciary, and the legislative. The Iranian people elect the members of 
Parliament every four years. Since the death of Khomeini, the parliament’s political 
importance has increased significantly. It drafts legislation, ratifies treaties, approves 
states of emergency, approves loans and the annual budget, and can remove the presi-
dent and ministers from office. In 1979, the constitution initially divided the power of 
executive power between the president and the prime minister. Actual leadership over 
the executive power was in the hands of the prime minister, who, in contrast to the 
president, was not elected by the Iranian people. This was designed in order to avert 
competition between the elected president and unelected Supreme Leader. However, 
when Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president in 1989, the office of prime 
minister was abolished and his tasks taken over by the president as the sole head of the 
elected executive branch (Riefer-Flanagan, 2013: 59–75).
As of now, the president is the head of government and appoints and dismisses 
ministers, who have to be confirmed by parliament. The president controls the Plan-
ning and Budget Organization, appoints the head of the Central Bank, and chairs the 
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC, shura-e amniat-e melli). The SNSC has 
twelve permanent members who coordinate governmental activities in defense, intel-
ligence services, and foreign policy. The president acts as the chairman of the SNSC. 
The Supreme Leader has personal representatives at the SNSC. Formally, the presi-
dency holds the second most influential political office, but the president cannot make 
final decisions on foreign policy and has no control over the armed forces (Stolarczyk, 
2001: 268).
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The IRI’s system seems to be dualistic with religious and republican institutions. 
Such a complicated system provokes factions within the IRI’s political spectrum. As 
observed by Ray Takeyh, the Iranian political system consists of three intensive fac-
tions: conservatives, pragmatists, and reformers (Takeyh, 2007: 32), who compete 
within the IRI’s frameworkIn addition, each faction has different political representa-
tives and ideas, resulting in a competition for influence and power within the institu-
tion of the IRI. Within the Iranian political spectrum, there are no legal political par-
ties. At least three factions play the role of prohibited political parties. Rivalry among 
different political factions has an impact on the process of political decision-making 
and forms an obstacle to the formulation of coherent domestic and foreign policies in 
some cases.
The Islamic Revolution was anti-Western from its beginning. It brought about the 
final break with the United States. Prior the Islamic Revolution, Iran was envisioned 
as a strategic state, allied with the United States. The largest change resulted from 
breaking alliances with the United States and with Western powers in general. The 
new principles of Iran’s foreign policy were introduced in the new Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. These principles were as follows: (1) to refuse all forms of 
“external domination,” (2) “preservation of Iran’s independence and territorial integ-
rity,” (3) “defense of the rights of all Muslims without allying with hegemonic pow-
ers,” and (4) “the maintenance of peaceful relations with all non- belligerent states” 
(Ehteshami, Zweiri, 2008: 13).
The IRI’s foreign policy consists of five phases:
1) from 1979–1989, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader;
2) from 1989– 1997, during the presidency of Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani;
3) from 1997–2005, during the presidency of Hojatolislam Mohammad Khatami;
4) from 2005–2013 during the presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad;
5) from 2013 onwards, during the presidency of Hasan Rouhani.
Khomeini deeply imprinted Iranian theocracy on its foreign policy. He linked con-
frontation with the West to the elimination of liberal and moderate forces from the 
Iranian political scene. The seizure of the US Embassy on November 4, 1979 and the 
444-day hostage dispute that followed became the crucible of an idealistic revolution-
ary foreign policy that set Iran against much of the rest of the world. Radicalism out-
raged moderates (Axworthy, 2013; Bowden, 2006).
In 1981, Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr, elected as president in 1980, was forced to resign 
because he openly criticized the overly dominant role of the Supreme Leader and the 
concept of dominance of the clergy over other factions. Iran’s confrontational foreign 
policy brought the country into isolation and its only ally in the Middle East remained 
Syria. In response to this perceived threat, as well as that of the spread of the Iran-Iraq 
war and the perspective of the spread of Khomeinism, the six Arab Gulf states estab-
lished the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as a preventive and protective institution. 
Iran supported radical groups and even dispatched Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon 
to assist Hezbollah. This group was responsible for the attempted coup in Bahrain in 
1981, as well as the suicide car bombings on American and French forces in Lebanon 
in October 1983 and acts of violence in Kuwait (Thaler, Nader, Chubin, Green, 2010: 
75–116).
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The deteriorating position of Iran in the region and harmful losses in the war with 
Iraq forced Khomeini to opt for more pragmatic acts, such as the secret purchase of 
arms from the United States, “the Great Satan,” and Israel, “the lesser Satan.” Iran’s 
defensive war against Iraq occasioned such a bold move. A deal was struck through in-
termediaries. American and Israeli arms were to be shipped to Iran in return for Iran’s 
help with the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. These moves did not improve 
the deteriorated relations with the West, but revealed a pragmatism, even from hardlin-
ers. However, it was kept a secret within the Iranian decision-making community and 
was not a convenient fact.
After Khomeini’s turbulent decade, the divisions within the Iranian government 
between hardliners and pragmatic faction was evident. The pragmatic Rafsanjani un-
derstood the limits and weaknesses of the IRI and proposed a more conciliatory policy 
to Iranian neighbors and rapprochement with Western Europe. Rafsanjani’s policy was 
incomplete due to internal tensions with the Ali Khamenei (the new Supreme Leader), 
a collision between ideological tenets and pragmatism and Iranian national interests 
(Osiewicz, 2017: 115–125). The attempt of reconciliation with Western Europe was 
undermined by the Mykonos affair. Iran was listed by the US State Department as 
a sponsor of terrorism and broad sanctions were imposed, which were also harmful 
for American allies who would like to do business in Iran. Rafsanjani was restricted in 
international politics and blocked by the hardliners’ faction.
In May 1997, a new president was elected, and Muhammad Khatami gained 
strong support, mostly from Iranian youth, and reached a victory of 70 percent. His 
major aims were to seek the rule of law and the people’s participation in political, 
social and cultural matters. The new president was aware that positive relations with 
especially the West were needed to help Iran’s ailing economy and obtain much-
needed foreign investments and transfers of high technology. His inaugural speech 
laid a clear emphasis on national pride, the importance of Iranian national interest 
and the dialogue between nations. While president Khatami initiated a “dialogue 
between civilizations,” Supreme Leader Khamenei undermined these attempts by 
continuing the support of Islamist radical groups in other Muslim countries, such 
as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. Additionally, the 
emphasis on improving foreign relations and international dialogue was a continu-
ation of a trend that begun under Rafsanjani. As B. Kaussler observed: “Ironically, 
President Khatami himself was to blame for the deadlock. Since 2000, Khatami had 
been under pressure from two groups. His reformist allies, who had been pushing 
for him to take an active stance against the hardliners and had time and again ap-
proached him to shift to a more confrontational approach, which they considered as 
the only language Iran’s nomenklatura would understand” (Kaussler, 2008, 276). It 
is noteworthy that the Khatami cabinet was composed of nineteen technocrats and 
only three clergymen. He kept many individuals close to Rafsanjani and selected 
a few candidates out of compromise to appease the conservatives, led by Majlis 
speaker Nateq-Nouri and close to Khamenei. He made these concessions in order to 
employ his own key allies, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, Culture and Islamic 
Guidance Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, and Interior Minister Abdollah Nuri (Kha-
lili, 2016: 28–34).
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In 2002 a nuclear crisis erupted, which deeply hampered Khatami’s attempts to 
reconcile with the West. The nuclear program and its negotiations were under control 
of hardliners. For example, the chief negotiator, Hassan Rouhani, works directly with 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was responsible for appointing him to 
the National Security Council (Takeyh, 2003).
After failed reform attempts in 2005, Mahmud Ahmedinejad assumed the of-
fice of president as a result of hard presidential elections. As the new president, he 
differed from his predecessors in several regards. Unlike most previous presidents 
of the Islamic Republic, with the exception of the short presidencies of Bani-Sadr 
and Mohammad Rajaei, Ahmadinejad was not a cleric or even the son of a cleric. 
Ahmadinejad’s election brought a marginalized minority branch of the conservative 
faction to power, which had become radicalized after the Iran-Iraq war, in which 
it was excluded from policy-making by the then dominant factions of the Iranian 
political elite.
The 2005 presidential elections presented a choice among the pragmatist, but still 
very popular former president Rafsanjani, three relative moderates (former speaker of 
the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi, former cabinet minister Mostafa Moin, and former vice 
president Mohsen Mehralizadeh) and three conservatives (national law enforcement 
head Mohammed Baqr Qalibaf, government official Ali Larijani and Tehran mayor 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). Rafsanjani led in the first round of voting and posed a chal-
lenge to the Supreme Leader, making Ahmadinejad the Ayatollah’s preferred choice 
(Kwapiszewski, 2006: 19). In the second round Ahmadinejad was elected by a margin 
of 62 percent to 36 percent for first time in the history of the IRI. There were allega-
tions of voter fraud (Nasr, 2005: 18).
Initially, Iranian foreign policy was consistent with the line of hardliners, opting 
for the development of a nuclear program. Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad was a great 
troublemaker in many aspects as a devote Muslim who sought and was publicly 
expecting the hidden Imam, who denied the Holocaust and who made many hostile 
announcements against Israel. The president was not experienced in pursuing careful 
diplomacy, his style was confrontational, accelerated the imposition of hard sanc-
tions and brought a condemnation and the international isolation of Iran. All was 
caused by the militarization of the nuclear program and Ahmadinejad’s blunt state-
ments on undeniable right of Iran to develop nuclear weapons. During his first term, 
Ahmadinejad followed the course of the Supreme Leader and there were no serious 
controversies, though the price of such conduct became high. The internal crisis 
erupted with the fraud of the presidential elections in 2009. Ahmadinejad was very 
unpopular and was treated as the Supreme Leader’s puppet. The Guardian Council 
approved only three challengers to Ahmadinejad: two moderates, Mehdi Karroubi 
and Mir Hussein Mousavi, and one traditional conservative, Mohsen Rezai. All op-
posing candidates heavily criticized Ahmadinejad’s problematic and controversial 
presidency. Due to secret polls, reformer Mousavi would win the election against 
Ahmadinejad by roughly 10 million votes (Bahari, 2009). The election fraud evoked 
massive protests by the Green Movement and apparent discontent among the Iranian 
youth. The demonstrations were broken up with arrests and indiscriminate use of 
violence.
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The second term of the Ahmadinejad presidency seemed to be more subordinated 
to the Supreme Leader, especially in matters of foreign policy. In 2010, the president 
escalated tensions with the hardliners and the Supreme Leader himself, which culmi-
nated in Ahmadinejad’s firing of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, the former 
campaign manager for Ali Larijani’s presidential candidacy. The crisis was hidden 
by Khamenei to avoid the appearance of an elite division. The president was encour-
aged by his victory, in 2011 he demanded the resignation of the Minister of Intel-
ligence, Heider Moslehi. The Supreme Leader opposed and revealed tensions with 
the president to the public. Hardliners and the old guard removed close associates of 
Ahmadinejad, such as deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Sharif Malekzadeh and 
later the president’s press adviser and head of the Islamic Republic News Agency 
(Javanfekr, Sherril, 2013: 69).
Divisions among conservatives and hardliners and the harmful effects of interna-
tional sanctions opened the door for Hassan Rouhani. He served for many years on 
the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and was personally nominated for the 
function of chief nuclear negotiator by the Supreme Leader. Although he is a hard-
liner, he developed a reputation for his moderation and pragmatism. According to of-
ficial vote totals, Rouhani won by 50.7 percent of votes; Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf 
got 16.6 percent, Saeed Jalili 11.4 percent, Mohsen Rezai 10.6 percent, Ali Akbar 
Velayati 6.2 percent, and Mohammad Gharazi 1.2 percent. The conservative Gholam 
Ali Haddad-Adel withdrew prior to the election (BBC News, 2013).
Rouhani dedicated his foreign policy to achieving a nuclear deal in order to remove 
sanctions and end Iran’s isolation. This aim was also accepted by the Supreme Leader 
to avoid rising Iranians dissatisfaction caused by the deteriorating economic situation. 
After intensive negotiations, a nuclear agreement was reached in July 2015, known 
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January 2016, all sanctions 
against Tehran had been lifted, the Islamic Republic reduced its program and accepted 
intensive international inspections. The nuclear deal worked well, took Iran from a re-
cession to an estimated 7% of annual economic growth, reduced the inflation rate 
from 40% to less than 10%, rebounded oil exports to pre-sanction levels, and attracted 
roughly $12 billion in foreign investments (Mousavian, 2017).
The Iranian economy is still weak and stagnant, and the long period of isolation 
combined with ineffective and bureaucratic processes caused the largest demonstration 
since the Green Movement. The high unemployment rate of 12.5% is painful, especial-
ly for the Iranian youth. The wide scale of demonstrations and discontent apparent in 
different cities in Iran resulted in the renouncement of proposed cuts in subsidies. The 
protests are a clear signal: Iranians are waiting for an improvement in the economy and 
more foreign investments to create additional jobs and are dissatisfied with the high 
costs of the Iranian involvement in Syria, Yemen and other places in the Middle East.
Both in the first and second term, president Rouhani has avoided conflicts with 
Khamenei. However, some tensions are noticeable and could deepen in the movement 
towards the western powers. Under the Donald Trump administration, the nuclear deal 
is treated as imperfect. Washington would like to force Iran to stop almost all compo-
nents of its nuclear program. A harsher stance towards Iran would encourage hardlin-
ers to conduct a more confrontational policy.
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* * *
The Iranian political system, with its elements of duality in pursuing foreign policy, 
provokes tensions in decision-making levels from top to bottom. At least three fac-
tions exist within the political system: conservatives with their hardliner vanguard, 
pragmatists, and reformers. All factions influence the Iranian political system. Even 
during his revolutionary favor, Khomeini ultimately decided to attain achievable 
goals. The 1979 hostage crisis basically hit moderates and ousted them from the 
Iranian political scene.
The president’s role is minor compared to the Supreme Leader and it is almost 
impossible for the president to formulate a foreign policy without the consent of the 
Supreme Leader. Since 1989, presidents after Ahmadinejad presented a more moder-
ate approach in regard to internal and external policies. Rafsanjani was focused on 
a pragmatic foreign policy and reconciliation with the West. This policy was curtailed 
by hardliners to open Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic jihad, all 
listed by Israel and USA as terrorist organisations.
Reformer Khatami initially gained massive support but was not prepared enough 
as a political leader to face hardliners and conservatives. Beyond the president’s 
power was the development of the nuclear program, which caused a crisis with west-
ern powers.
After failed reforms, Ahmadinejad won the elections twice with support of the 
Supreme Leader. During his presidency, Ahmadinejad contributed to the isolation of 
Iran and his confrontational foreign policy and radical statements were accepted by the 
Supreme Leader. In 2009, suspected fraudulent elections gave rise to the Green Move-
ment and the greatest protests since the Islamic Revolution. Ahmadinejad was unable 
to change the course of foreign policy, although he had some tensions with Khamenei 
over personal nominations.
After Ahmadinejad’s turbulent double tenure, the new president, Hassan Rouhani, 
agreed on concessions on the nuclear program with the consent of the Supreme Leader 
in order to lift harmful sanctions. Rouhani’s achievement, the nuclear deal, meant that 
Iran accepted a more limited nuclear program and more insightful inspections. In the 
end of 2017, social discontent erupted, caused by the high rate of unemployment and 
the stagnant economy. However, the protests were curtailed for a moment. Still, the 
hardliner faction has an ambition to reinstate the revolutionary favor and the isolation 
of Iran, contrary to societal expectations and the support of the Iranian youth to moder-
ates and reformers.
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aBstract
The Islamic Republic of Iran has a political structure with co-shared and competitive activ-
ity in the field of foreign policy. There are two power centres the president and the supreme 
leader. Iranian political elite is composed of factions of the conservatives, moderates, prag-
matists, and reformers. Each faction has influence on the course of Iranian foreign policy. The 
dominant faction, conservatives, has caused isolation and imposition of severe sanctions on 
Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency Although domestic sources of foreign policy reveals 
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competition among different factions there is consensus in principal goals of Iranian foreign 
policy.
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W Islamskiej Republice występują dwa ośrodki władzy, które współdecydują w zakresie po-
lityki zagranicznej Iranu. Najszersze prerogatywy posiada Najwyższy Przywódca, a jedynie 
pewien zakres kompetencji w polityce zagranicznej posiada prezydent. Mimo to, dochodzi do 
różnego rodzaju napięć oraz rozbieżności w formułowaniu polityki zagranicznej. Dodatkowym 
czynnikiem wywierającym wpływ na wspomniane ośrodki władzy są następujące frakcje: kon-
serwatywna, umiarkowana, pragmatyczna i reformatorska. Przedstawiciele poszczególnych 
frakcji rywalizują ze sobą, także chcą mieć wpływ na politykę zagraniczną
 
Słowa kluczowe: Iran, polityka zagraniczna, Najwyższy Przywódca
